Summary: Studies exploring relationships between belief in the paranormal and vulnerability to cognitive bias suggests that believers are liable to misperception of chance and conjunction fallacy. Research investigating misperception of chance has produced consistent findings, whilst work on conjunction fallacy is less compelling. Evidence indicates also that framing biases within a paranormal context can increase believers' susceptibility. The present study, using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling, examined the contribution of each bias to belief in the paranormal and assessed the merits of previous research. Alongside the revised paranormal belief scale, participants completed standard and paranormal framed perception of randomness and conjunction problems. Perception of randomness was more strongly associated with belief in the paranormal than conjunction fallacy. Inherent methodological issues limited the usefulness of framing manipulations; presenting problems within a paranormal context weakened their predictive power. 
INTRODUCTION
Several studies report positive associations between probability misjudgement and belief in the paranormal (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Brugger, Landis, & Regard, 1990; Brugger & Taylor, 2003; Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, & Rowley, 2014; Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007) . Seminally, Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) observed that nonbelievers (goats) outperformed psi believers (sheep) on tasks requiring judgements of probability. Collectively, findings are consistent with Bressan's (2002) notion that believers in the paranormal possess a lower subjective chance threshold, which inclines them to perceive unrelated events as causally related.
Following a review of previous work, Dagnall et al. (2007) postulated that misrepresentation of chance (poor understanding of coincidence) influenced the development and maintenance of paranormal beliefs. To test this notion, Dagnall et al. (2007) asked participants to complete the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004 ) alongside a range of problem-solving tasks. Tasks assessed four reasoning domains: perception of randomness (judging the likelihood of obtaining strings/sequences), base rate (probability of a stated outcome in relation to base rate information), conjunction fallacy (determining statistical biases are germane. This category subsumes both chance (mistaking random events for essential process characteristics; Wagenaar, 1988) and conjunction (the overestimation of probability in compound problems; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) . To date few papers have considered the association between these biases in relation to paranormal belief. The notion that misperception of chance and conjunction can be located within a mutual category explains potentially their respective relationships to belief in the paranormal. Arnott's (1998 Arnott's ( , 2006 classification system provides a structure for conceptualising and comprehending previous findings. Particularly, within the present paper it enabled the prediction of precise relationships between biases and belief in the paranormal. The hierarchical structure of statistical bias indicated that misperception of chance would be the best predictor of belief in the paranormal. It predicted also, that any observed relationship between conjunction and belief would be largely attributable to common membership of the statistical bias category. Thus, the authors proposed that proneness to conjunction fallacy represented a specific manifestation of misrepresentation of chance. Operationalized, this hypothesis predicted that whilst misrepresentation of chance and proneness to conjunction correlated positively, conjunction would explain little unique variance in belief in the paranormal.
Additionally, the present study investigated whether susceptibility to heuristic bias varied as a function of belief type. Research suggests that paranormal beliefs are multi rather than unidimensional. Particularly, top-down purification of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale by Lange, Irwin, and Houran (2000) produced two correlated item sets, New Age Philosophy and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs (Houran, Irwin, & Lange, 2001 ). These clusters distinguish paranormal beliefs in terms of function (individual vs. social) . New Age Philosophy (psi, witchcraft, spiritualism and astrology) functions at the individual/personal level and instils a sense of control over external events (Irwin, 1992) , whereas Traditional Paranormal Beliefs (traditional religious beliefs, witchcraft and precognition) manage external events at a social cultural level (Goode, 2000) . Accordingly, personal experiences reinforce New Age Philosophy and cultural events strengthen Traditional Paranormal Beliefs.
There is tentative evidence to suggest these differences may influence susceptibility to heuristic bias. For example, Dagnall et al. (2014) Finally, the present paper extended examination of framing effects. Alongside standard situations, problems appeared couched (framed) within a paranormal context. This included paranormal based misrepresentation of chance problems. Previous studies manipulating conjunction context failed to explore the effects of framing on misrepresentation of chance. For this reason and because framing manipulations have formerly produced inconsistent results, only tentative predictions were proffered. It was anticipated that standard problems would be harder to solve than those presented in a paranormal context. Additionally, observed differences between problem types (misrepresentation of chance and conjunction) would reduce when the problems appeared within a paranormal context; previously problems framed in a paranormal context proved easier to solve than standard problems, however this advantage was less pronounced in paranormal believers (Dagnall et al., 2014) .
METHOD

Participants
A sample of 223 participants (57 male participants, 26% and 166 female participants, 74%) took part in the study. Participant mean age was 23.00, SD = 8.41; ages ranged from 18-56 years. The mean for males was 24.85, SD = 9.78; range 18-65 years, and for females the mean was 22.36, SD = 7.82; range 18-61 years. The sample comprised 67% enrolled undergraduate students (Health & Social Care, 89% and Arts & Humanities, 11%) and 33% non-students. Prior to participation, a question asked whether participants had previously studied heuristic bias. If participants endorsed the question, participation discontinued.
Materials
Probabilistic reasoning tasks
The reasoning section comprised 20 problems divided into five sections, each containing one of four problem types:
Perception of randomness
Problems assessed participants' ability to judge accurately perception of chance, particularly the likelihood of strings/sequences (e.g., 'imagine a coin was tossed six times. Which pattern of results do you think is most likely? (a) HHHHHH, (b) HHHTTT, (c) HTHHTT, (d) all equally likely').
Conjunction fallacy
Participants selected the most likely outcome from a range of presented alternatives. These took the form of statements involving either single or co-occurring events (e.g., 'two football 
Paranormal conjunction fallacy
Paranormal problems possessed the same underlying structure as standard conjunctions; the probability of event intersection could not exceed the probability of single constituent events (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1982 Perception of randomness, conjunction fallacy and paranormal conjunction fallacy problems derived from Dagnall et al. (2007 Dagnall et al. ( , 2014 .
Paranormal perception of randomness
The fourth problem type, paranormal perception of randomness involved presenting string/sequence probability judgments in a paranormal context. Paranormal perception of randomness problems possessed the same underlying structure as standard perception of randomness problems. For example, 'A famous psychic, with renowned paranormal abilities, has successfully predicted the outcome of the last 6 annually held boat races between two famous English Universities [University A and University B]. This year the psychic predicts University B will win. Which of the following is most likely?: (a) University A will win the event , (b) University B will win the event, (c) University A and University B are both equally as likely to win the event.
Counterbalancing problem type order controlled for potential order effects.
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale
The Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983 , Tobacyk, 1988 ) is a selfreport measure that assesses belief in seven facets of paranormal belief: psi, witchcraft, spiritualism, superstition, traditional religious belief, extraordinary life forms and precognition. The Revised Paranormal Belief Scale contains 26 questions presented as statements (e.g., 'There is a devil'), responses are measured via a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Purification of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale by Rasch scaling requires responses to be recoded (0-6) (Lange et al., 2000) . Recoding produces summative scores ranging from 0 to 156, higher scores indicate belief in the paranormal. Scale purification lead to the identification of two psychometrically superior factors, New Age Philosophy and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs.
New Age Philosophy (11-items) evaluates belief in psi, reincarnation, altered states and astrology, whereas Traditional Paranormal Beliefs (5-items) assesses belief in concepts, such as the devil and witchcraft (Irwin, 2004) . New Age Philosophy scores range from 6.85 to 47.72 and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs 11.16 to 43.24 (Andrich, 1988) . The Revised Paranormal Belief Scale is the most widely used measure of paranormal belief (Goulding & Parker, 2001) . Despite, concerns about the factorial structure of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Lawrence, 1995a (Lawrence, , 1995b , the measure demonstrates adequate validity (Tobacyk, 2004) . Overall, the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale is a conceptually and psychometrically satisfactory measure of paranormal belief (Tobacyk, 2004) . Within studies examining relationships between belief in the paranormal and cognitive biases, the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale has produced similar findings to the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (see Dagnall et al., 2014) . The present investigation preferred the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale because its factorial structure enabled the examination of relationships between specific belief types (New Age Philosophy and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs) and cognitive biases; the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale typically provides only a general index of core paranormal beliefs (extra-sensory perception, psychokinesis and life after death) (Wiseman & Watt, 2006) .
Procedure
After assenting to take part, participants received the test booklet. This contained a set of instructions stating that under test conditions they must attempt to answer all questions. On completion of the problems, participants filled in a copy of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale. At the conclusion of testing, the researcher debriefed the participants. All aspects of the study followed the protocols and procedures outlined within the British Psychological Society (2009) ethical guidelines. The study was part of an ethically approved ongoing funded research project.
RESULTS
Scale properties and inter-measure correlations
Following data screening, the researchers calculated the means, standard deviations and Table 1 ).
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Problem type descriptive statistics
Problem solution scores were calculated (perception of randomness, conjunction fallacy, paranormal perception of randomness, paranormal conjunction fallacy, overall standard, and overall paranormal). In Table 2 , these appear as means and proportions alongside interproblem correlations. Pearson product moment revealed positive correlations between problem types.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Belief in the paranormal and problem task solution
A further set of Pearson product moment correlations found positive associations between belief in the paranormal and problem types (see Table 3 ).
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Analytical strategy
Analysis comprised a series of discrete but related sections. First, Harman's single-factor test evaluated common method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) Model fit was determined via consideration of absolute and relative fit indices.
Absolute fit indices assess the degree to which a hypothetical model fits observed data (i.e. chi-square, standardized root mean-square residual and root mean-square error of approximation). Relative fit compares the proposed model and the chi-square value of the null model (i.e. Tucker Lewis Index -TLI, Tucker & Lewis, 1973; and Comparative Fit Index -CFI, Cronbach, 1990) . A range of goodness-of-fit statistics assessed model fit.
Chi-square (χ 2 ) evaluated the difference between the observed and expected covariance matrices; good fitting models produce non-significant results. Chi-square however, is influenced by sample size; small samples are associated with type I errors and large samples type II errors (Tanaka, 1987 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993) . These criteria determined model fit alongside relative fit indices.
Harman's single-factor test
Harman's single-factor test assessed whether common method variance was a problem within the present data set. Common method variance refers to variance attributable to the measurement method rather than the constructs measured. Common method variance is potentially an issue when dependent and focal explanatory variables are perceptual measures derived from the same respondent (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) . Common method variance within cross-sectional studies may produce correlation inflation (Lindell & Whitney, 2001 Confirmatory factor analysis examined construct structure also.
Confirmatory factor analyses
Theoretically driven confirmatory factor analysis indicated satisfactory two-factor correlated models for belief in the paranormal, standard problems and problems framed within a paranormal context. Although the chi-square value for the two-factor Revised Paranormal Adequacy of the two-factor correlated models was determined also in relation to parameter estimates. All factor loadings, except one, were positive and statistically significant. Generally, items possessed factor loadings greater than the minimum threshold of .32 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001 ). The majority of indicators exhibited factor loadings above .60, satisfying the strict factor loading requirements of Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998).
Reliability analysis
Latent modelling cautions that traditional measures of internal reliability (i.e. Cronbach's α) over or underestimate scale reliability (Raykov, 2002) . In this context, composite reliability provides a more rigorous assessment of internal reliability. When considering composite reliability, values greater than .60 are acceptable (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000) . Results
for the standard problems indicated that perception of randomness (ρc = .89) and conjunction fallacy (ρc = .71) possessed satisfactory composite reliability. Problems framed in a paranormal context, paranormal perception of randomness, and paranormal conjunction fallacy possessed satisfactory composite reliability (ρc =.60 and ρc = .64 respectively).
Finally, Traditional Paranormal Beliefs and New Age Philosophy demonstrated also satisfactory composite reliability (ρc =.60 and ρc = .60 respectively).
Model test Standard problem types with paranormal beliefs
INSERT Within the present study, the observed relationship between conjunction fallacy and belief in the paranormal concurs with Rogers et al.'s (2009 Rogers et al.'s ( , 2011 observation that paranormal believers (vs. non-believers) made more conjunction errors. This result, however, requires further examination. Consideration of partial correlations between standard problem types and belief in the paranormal revealed that conjunction fallacy explained only a small (non-significant) amount of unique variance. Contrastingly, correlations between perception of randomness and paranormal belief, controlling for conjunction fallacy, reduced only slightly and remained significant.
These findings support the notion that conjunction fallacy correlates with belief in the paranormal because it shares common variance with perception of randomness. In the context of paranormal belief, it appears that conjunction fallacy may represent a specific instance of perception of randomness; one where believers mistakenly attribute causal relationships to co-occurring events (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Brugger & Taylor, 2003; Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002) . Rogers (2014) concurs with this view and notes that earlier work appeared to suggest that belief in the paranormal was associated with two separate types of probabilistic reasoning bias, misperception and conjunction. However, differences between the two biases diminish when conjunction is conceptualised as the cooccurrence of unrelated component parts. Thus, believers' proneness to conjunction error reflects merely their tendency to misperceive random events as causally related (Rogers, 2014) . This interpretation fits intuitively and empirically with previous work and is consistent with Arnott's (1998 Arnott's ( , 2006 classification system. Arnott's system when applied to the study of belief in the paranormal, predicted that misperception of chance would be the best predictor of belief in the paranormal and that any observed relationship between conjunction and paranormal belief would be attributable to common membership of a statistical bias category.
Collectively, results for standard problem types support previous work demonstrating a stronger relationship between perception of randomness and belief in the paranormal (than conjunction fallacy; Dagnall et al., 2007; . With reference to the formative Dagnall et al. (2007) paper, consistent misreporting undermined the credibility of the original findings (cf. Brotherton & French, 2014; Rogers et al., 2009; 2011; see Dagnall et al., 2014 Clearly, there is no reason to suppose that respondents, who believe in one aspect of the paranormal (e.g., ESP) will be similarly influenced by paranormally framed problems drawn from areas in which they are more sceptical (e.g., ghosts and hauntings). Framed problems, in this context provide only a crude/limited (belief specific) insight into heuristical bias.
Recent work by Brotherton and French (2014) support the notion that an alien craft crashed (Nickell, 2009; Thomas, 1995) . In this respect, endorsement of conspiracy theories mirrors superficially the structure of conjunction errors.
Thus, although conjunction fallacy is weakly associated with belief in the paranormal, susceptibility to conjunction error may link more strongly to endorsement of conspiracy theories (Brotherton & French, 2014) .
Conclusion
This study adds to the emerging body of evidence advocating an association between belief in the paranormal and perception of randomness (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Tobacyk & Wilkinson, 1991) . Pragmatically, perception of randomness manifests as misrepresentation of chance and results in believers (vs. non-believers) misattributing causality to random, coincidental events (Bressan, 2002; Brugger & Taylor, 2003; Gilovich & Savitsky, 2002) .
Previous work elucidates that this reflects believers' tendency to base judgements on subjective perceptions/interpretations rather than the objective laws of probability (Rogers et al., 2009) . Considering the prosaic nature of paranormal beliefs within modern society (Castro, Burrows, & Wooffitt, 2014) misperception of chance appears to reflect an information processing preference not a cognitive deficit (Dagnall et al., 2014) .
With regard to heuristic bias, the results support previous work reporting a stronger relationship between perception of randomness and belief in the paranormal than conjunction fallacy (Dagnall et al., 2007; . There was no evidence to suggest that conjunction fallacy was/is a major factor associated with the development and maintenance of paranormal beliefs. Framing manipulations indicated that whilst paranormal framed problems were easier to solve, the advantage declined as a function of belief in the paranormal. However, methodological concerns/issues limit the degree to which framing manipulations provide insights into the relationship between heuristical bias and paranormal belief. 
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